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It is almost impossible to formulate a single
criterion to determine the question of a penalty or liquidated damages in every case;
established by decisions,

yet thc-e hs been certain rules

which may be a-:i-od to different

forms of arguments, yet there are of course many instances
which can not be brought y~ithin their operation.
If

the contract is

and a certain amount is

for a :..atter of certain value

to bc paid in broach of it

in the excess of that &ount,
which is

so fixed is

liquidaate 27=Zes.
,.

t,

then and in

be rez<%A>
Th-i-c on

vi>±ch is

th-t case the sum

as a l.nalt-

rhce other ha"',

and not as
if

the contract

is for -_ natter of uncertain value and an az:ount is
be a

quidated dnftts.

of
nc1
the se

the
-o,

,u; is

recovered

fixed to
14 -
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There are some rules which have been established
by judicial authority which -:uiii i.;7v" be tak.en up and fully
discussed in every i.articrilar.
TIPRT.

Then tho payment of

is secured by a larger

-u

smaller anount of money

tthe -aout theno

contracted for

can under no circiumstance whatever be treated as liquidated
damages, but must in every ca.e always be treated as a penalty.
Pomeroy's 1(q. Jur., Vol. I.,Sec. 4$1.

It is competent for

all parties to a coitract for the purchase or sale of real
property to liquidate and settle by agreement among themdelve4
the amount of damages which one party is to pay to the other
upon a breach of the contract, instead of leaving such amount
to be ascortaine,. by 2 court or jury.
sulting from a breach are uncertain in

Since injuries rea:ount,

as they are

in every case other than when the contract is to pay,

the

parties usually have the right to say how amuch shall be paid
by way of compensation to the injure-_.

and when they have

settled that amount, neither a court of equity or a court of
law will diminish its

amount unless it

actual injury that a fair ,inded
mention of it.

e so in excess of the

man would start at the

The courts are not authorized to make a

bare

or unma"zc the one made by them,

new contract for tho rarties,
and hold,

from the circiurwtancos of the situation and the

nature of the transaction,

that the rartics

to the transaction

intended anything different from what they expressed.
the yarties to a contract,

Vrhen

in w.hich the amount of damfages is

to be ascertained,

coring from a breaci of a contract,

certain in

amount,

agrec

damages in

case of failure to rerform the same,

is

un-

that a certain amount shall be the

guage plainly ex-ressive of an agreement

and in

lan-

I lznow of no prin-

ciple or sound rule of law ap-Ilicable to the construction of
contracts which will enable a court of law to say that they
intended something else.

Where the sum fixed is greatly

disproportionate to the prc7sumed actual damage,

probably a

court of equity may relieve; but a court of law has no right
to erroneously construe the intention of the parties to a
contract, when it is clearly expressed, in the endeavor to
make a better contract for them than they have actually made
for themselvos.

In all cases, however, it is the duty of

the courts to find out what the true intent of the parties
is and then to carry it into effect.
cause may arise in which it

is

It is true that a

doubtful from the language
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which is

emprloyed in

the origi±~il instrument,

whether the

parties to the contract meant to agree upon the measure of
compensation to the injure2 y arty in

ca-e of a breach.

In

such cases there would. be room for construction; but certainly
none when the meaning of the parties was evident and urunistakable.

When they declare, in

distinct and unequivocal

terms, that they have settled and fixed the damages to be a
certain amount,

or any other sum to be paid by either failing

to perform it seems wron: for a court to tell them that they
have looiked into the contract and reached the conclusion that
it was not the thing which was intonded; but that the intention was to name the sum as a penalty to cover any damages
that might be -roved to have been sustained by a breach of
the agreement.
Certain rules have been established that are supposed to control the construction ,f contracts although in the
view of some it has been difficult, if not impossible, to
support an agreement for liquidated damages in

cases where

the amount ascertained by the piarties seera cis- ro-ortionate
to the conjectured actual damage@.
There such damages as are stipulatcd in

the gross

amount fixed by the terms of the contract for failurd to
perform the same, is in the nature of a penalty, or ;,.st be
adjudged as liquidated cdan~ag s,

can only be determined by

ascertaining. the into'ction of the parties,

as gathered both

from the language of the contract and from the nature and circumstances of the case.

Unless the intent of the parties

is very clearly expresscd the forfeiture named for non-fulfillment of a contract, when excessive, will not be construe.

as intended to be -qui-ated

Lawrence et al,

shou-.-d fail

Colnell vs.

38 I.Y., 71.

"he--e a s
agreement

damages.

:s specJ'icaliy named in

"as liquidate-f

damages,"

in

a written

case either party

to perform the contract rmst,

nevertheless,

be

construed as a penalty, when, upon the face of the instrument,
it

appears that such sum will necessarily be an inadequate

compensation for the breach of some of the provisions and
more than enough for the breach of others.
sition is

sustained by rnimerous

This propo-

authorities :ot only in New

York. but in other states.
Thus we see in Bagley vs.

Peddu,

16 T.Y.,

469,

where a bond declared the obligors to be bound ,in the sum of
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$3000 as liquidated damagc,

and not by way of penalty or

otherwise," for the p-rformance
agreement.
money,

of the c-.,venants in

None of the covenant!

a written

was for the payment of

or for the icing or omitting of any act the damages

resulting from which could be computed from data furn ished by
the instrument itself; but the damages for -any breach were
uncertain and required evidence aliundi
establish their amount.

the instrument to

One of the covenants was not to

reveal the secrets of trade in which the priilcilal obligor
w..s to be employed, or any invertion or improvement that might
be made by his e-&:rloyment,

the obliee.

IELD, that a breach

of this covenant involved da.iages so uncertain and difficult
to be ascertained,

as that the sum n-amed should be Jeemcd not

a penalty but liquidated damages,
any of the covenants,

recoverable upon a breach of

although the damages from the actual

breach might be readily determined by a jury.
7Then it

is

doiibtful whether the siLm inserted was

intended ?s a ipenalty or as liquidated dama-es, it vi*l be
considered in the nature of a penalty, especially if the payment of a certain damage less than the whole sum is provided
for by the instrument; but where the sum aw-plles as well to

-7-

stipulations where the cfz.ages,

in case of broach necessarily

must be uncertain, as to stipulations where the dsmagos
would be certain,

it

v.'ill be reoaraed as liqui'ate. damages

and not as a penalty.

SLCCND.

'.7hon the agreement

is

for the -erf'ormance or

non-performance of only one act, and there is no adequate mea
means of ascertininZ the

reeise damages w.hich may result

from a violation, the parties may, if they please, by a separate clause of the contr.ct,

fix u: -. the amount of compen-

sation payable by the defaulting party in case of a broach
and a stipulation inserted. for sIuch ,u--ose will be treated a
as one for "liquidated danages," unless the intent be clear
that it was designed to be only a penalty.

Pomeroy's Eq.

Jur., Vol. I., SoC. 442.
There are variuus legal rules for ascertaining
whether a sxz naned in a contr-act, to be raid by a defaulting -arty, was intender as liquidated
merely.

Among these rules

agos or a -enalty

is one well establclhed by numer-

ous decisions, that when a contract is such that the damages,
in case of a violation of it, will be uncertain in their na-
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ture and amount,

and the parties have stipulated that in

event of a breach a certain siun shall be paid b,
in

default,

as liquidated dwI:ages,

they vill

the

the rarty

be regarded as

having =o intended and that sum will be treated as the measure
of damages.
In the case of Smith et al vs. Coo, 33 !.Y.qup.Ct.,
In

481.

an action brought u;ion an alleged breach of a

covenant in a sealed lease, wherein the defendant covenanted
that ie would not at a-Ly time before June 186,
negotiate for,
or accet,

or be interest,-d in

1n-

le-ce of certain -remises

except from the :laintiff, under a forfeiture of ten thousand
dollars,
HELD,

to be paid liquidated domaes and not as a penalty,-

that the only question for the Jury to decide was as to

a breach of the covenant, as set forth in the lease, and if
they found that the defendant had violated the covenant then
they must also find a verdict

for da-magcs of ten thousand

dollars in

according to the stipulation in

!savor of plaintiff

the covenant.

THIRD.

;1oere t. IO

re(ment contains :rovisions for the

rerformance or non-etformance of acts which are not measur-
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able by any exact pecuniary standard, and also of one or more
other acts in respect of which the damages are easily ascertainable by a jury,

and a certain sun

is

stipulated to be

paid upon a violation of any or all of these provisions, such
sum must be taken to be a penalty.
I.,

Vol.

Pomeroy's 1]q.Jur.,

Sec. 445.
W1here a party agrees to do several things, one of

which is to pay a certain sum of money, and in case of a
failure to rerform any or ei'her of t7e stipulations, agrees
to pay a larger sum as liquidated damages,

the larger sum

is to be regarded in the nature of a penalty and being a penalty in

regard to one of the stipulations to be performed,

is a penalty as to all. "To the same effect are the case.Clement vs. Cash, 21 N.Y., 253, 259;

Bagley vs. Peddei,

16 N.Y., 410.

FOUl TV1.
as the third,
thereof.

This rule plainly rests upon the same grounds
and may be considered a particular

aplication

Pomeroy's Eq.Jur., Vol. I., Sec. 444.
In

the case of Lampman vs. Cockrani,

the head not reads as follows:

16 N.Y.,

275,

A sum specifically named in
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a written agreement

"as liquidated damages"

be construed as a penalty,

it

case either

to 'erform the contract, must, nevertheless,

party should fail

ment,

in

appears that suc.

when,

upon the face of the instru-

sum Ywill necessarily be an inad-

equate compensation for the breach of some of the provisions
and more than enough for the breach of others.

A contract

provided, among other things, that one -f the -arties should
give to the other,
$200,

on a speciffied day,

and on a subsequent

with interest,

a -romissory note for

day a bond and mortgage for $2000

and the -arties

agreed therein "to pay one to

the other the sum of 2500, as liquidated domages," upon failure to perform the contract;

HELD, that the sum mentioned is

to be regarded as having been wrongly named by the parties,
and as being in fact a penalty.

FIFTH.

Although :. agreement may contain two or more

provisions for the doing or not doing different acts still
where the stipulation to pay a certain sum of money upon a
default, a-taches to only one of these provisions, vhich is
of such a nature that there is

no c rtain means of ascertain-

ing the amount of damages resulting from its

violation,

or
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where all of the provisioK s are of' such -anature that the
damages occasioned by their breach cannot be measured, and
a certain s'nm is
any of them;

in

made .-ayable ut-on a default gunerally in
each of there cases the sxnn so agrcd to be

paid may be considered as liquidated damages,

provided,

of

course, that the language of thc stipulation does not bring
it

It

within the limitation of the preceeding fourth rule.

is evident that this proposition, in both its branches, is
identical in substance with the second rule heretofore given
and rests upon exactly the s --mc grounds.

Thc foregogin

may be considere-f as settled by the strong prepondcrance

rules
of

judicial authority and they serve to explain large and imporThere are undoubtedly -imerous in-

tant classes of cases.

stances which cannot be easily referred to eith of these
rules; and this must be so alrMost as a matter of necessity.
Since agreements are of indefinite variety in their objects
and in

their provisions,

liquidated damages is

and since the question of lpenalty or

always one of intention,

depending upon

the terms and circumstances of each particuiar contract,

there

mist -,e many agreements which cannot be brought within the
scope of any specific rule,

and vith 1rich a court can only
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deal by arl-ying the 1:iost general ca !on
Pomeroy's 1'q. Jur.,
It

is

of inter-fretation.

Vol. I., Sec. 445.

true the courts

In neirly all the cases pro-

fess to be construing the contract with reference to the intention of the parties, as if for the rurpose of ascertaining
and

Ziving effect to that intention; yet it is obvious from

the cases, that wherever it haF ayeareK to the court from
the face of the contract and the subject natter, that the
sum was clearly too large for just co v-rennation, here, while
they will allow any form of w-ords, even those expressing the
direct contrary to iradicate the intent to mahe it a penalty;
yet no form of words, no force of language is competent to the
expression of the opposite intent.

Here then is an intention

incaable of expression in words: @and as all written contracts
must be exrressed in ,Tor.s, it would seen to be a mere waste
of time and effort to lool for such an intention in such a
conth-act.

And as the question is between two oposite in-

tents only, and the

negation of one necessarily implies the

existence of the other, there woul' soem to be no room left
for construction with reference to the intent.
But some of the cases attempt to justify this mode
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of construing the cont'r .ct with reference to the intent by
declaring in

that though the language is

substance,

the stron-

gest which could be used to evince the intention in favor of
stipulated damages, still, if it clearly a-ear by reference
to the subject matter that the yarties have made the stipulation without r ference to the princirlle of just compen-ation
and so excessive as to be out of all rrowortion to the actual
damage, the court must hold that they coulz. not have intended
it

as stipulated damages,

clared.

though they have so expressly de-

Now this, it is true, may lead to the same result

in the particular case as to have placed the decision upon
the true ground,

Viz.-

that thnoug

the yarties actually in-

tended the sum to be -aid as the damages agreed between them,
yet it being clearl> inconscionable, the court would disreZard the intention and refuse to enforce the stipulation.
But as a rule of construction or interpretation of contracts,
it is radically vicious and tends to a confusion of ideas in
construction of contracts generally.
anything else,

which haf

It is this, more than

introduced so much ap-arent conflict

in the decisions upon this whole subject of penalty and stipulated damages.

It sets at defiance all rules of intcrpre-
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to be what they

tation by denying the intention of the larties
in

the most uncm' iguous terms,

have declar(d it

to be and

finds an intention directly o1:osite to that which is
exTpressed.

clearly

Again, the attempt to place this question upon

the intention of the parties, and to maze this the governing
if

consideration, necessarily imnilies t'at,
make the s=, stirulated damages shoul.

the intention to

clearly ap-,car,

the

court would enforce the cont-act arcording to that intention.
To test this,

let it

be asked whether,

in

such a case,

if

it

were admitted that the rarties actually intended the sum to
be considered as stipulated damages,
would a court of law enforce it
Clearly,

they could not,

and riot as a penalty,

for the amount stipulated?

without going back to the technical

and long exploded doctrine which gave the whole penalty of
the bond, without reference to the damages actually sustained.
They would thus be simply changing tife manner of things and
enforcing, under t'.e name of stipulated damages, whit in its
nature is but a penalty.
of cases will be founded,

The real question in this class
but whether the sum is,

in fact,

in the natnre of a renalty; and this is to be determined by
the magnitude of the sum, in connection v.ith the subject

in
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matter, and not at all by the worcds or - ...crstanding of the
parties.

cannot alter it.

The intcntion of the -.artie

7hile the courts of la,:: g-e the penalty 3f the
bond, the yarties intended the "-ayment of te -enalty as such
and did not inten- the rayment of stdam.1at.. dmages.
must,

the~-'efore,

'

ir,

be very obvi;,i

that te actual in-

tention of the -artie- in this class of cases,
this ioint, is vholly immJterial;

an-

t'no

It

and relating to

'---.
the courts have

very generally professed to base their decisions upon the
intention of the parties, that i:tontion ;s :not and cannot be
made the real basis of their

ecisions.

In endeavoring to

reconcile their decisions with the actual intention of the
parties, the courts have sometimes beeo

compelled to use

language wholly at wr, with any idea of interpretation and
to say "that the partics mst be considcred. as not meaning
exactly what they say."

Layr it not be said, with at least

equal propriety, that courts have sometimes said what they
did not exactly men:

The foregoing remarks are all to be

confined to that class of cases where it
sum mentioned. and the subjctc
compensation h ' beoe

di -rezari.

:as cler, from the

matter, -.
hat the -1rinciple of

-1-

The distinction between a

enalty for securing the

yerformancc of the contract,

and a stirullation vwhich makes -a

part of the contract itself,

may be

that if

illust-ated by the rule
cecured in

a certain rate of interest is

with an agreemen-t that if

it

-ot
A-id -runctually the rate

be

penalty and may be relicved against in
other hand,

if

is

tle larger interest

shall be increase-',

a mortgage,

the nature of a

in

equity.

But on the
with

the larger rate be origiually reserved,

an agreement for reiuetion on punctual payment,

-art of the contract and relief

for such punctual pay-aent is
cannot be given if

it

is

the condition

-not fulfilled.

In the case of Crishe vs. Bolton, 3 Car.& P., 240,
Best C.J.,

says:

"That parties to contracts,

can better appreciate

exactly their own intention and objects,
the consequences of their f .ling
than either ju-dges or juries;

to

and that

from znowing

obtain those objects
-f

a contract clearly

state ,Vhat shall be -aid by the -1arty who brao[s it
party to wh.ose -reJudice it

is

brohen,

to the

the verdict in

an

action for the breach should.be for the stirpulated sum;

that

a court of justice has no more authcrity to rut a different
construction on the part of the invtrniment

ascertaining the
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the amount of dara-es than it has to decic contrary to any
other of its clauses.

It is conccce o

by all that courts are

to be governel by the intention of the rarties, to be gathered
from the language of the contract anmd from the nature and
circumstances of the ca-c.
"Then there is a cont-.ct to Iay money, the damages
for its breach are fixed ar.7 lquidat o by law, and require
no liquidation by the parties.
An aroement to ,ay greater
damages is therefore re-arded as a renalty.

But when the

damages rcsulting from the breach are uncertain in amount,
as they are in all other cases, the -arties have the right to
say how much shall be -aid by way of compensation to the -arty
injured; and when they have settled that comr.ensation, neither
a court of lav*nor a court of equity vwill diminish its amount,
unless it be so -rossly dispr'o-.ortionatc to the actual injury
that a man would start at the bare mention of it.
,Tere there is a manifest aifficnlt-

in ascertaining

damages arising from the breac. of the contract, and the fair
conclusion is th-lt the amount is sIecificfL and agreed on for
the -urrose of savin- the ex-ense or avoiding the difficulty
of proving the actual

-amages, the yarties should be held to
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their bar-ain; and e.r-ecialiy

-. e the amount fixe

and

liquidate-! iF not far beyond v.hat might Iroperly be exp-ected
to arise from a breach of the contract.
.here the parties to a contract sti-ulate for a payment in liquidation of damages by a -,arty in default, if the
damages are in

their inature uncertain aa.

incapable of exact

ascertainment, and may be deyendent uron extrinsic consideration and circumstances, and the amount is not, on the face
of the contract, out of all Froportion to the j-obable loss,
it will be treated as liquidated dmanages.
The fact that the sum so s-roed to be -aid is trmed
by the rarties a"Ienalt':" is not controlling ulon the

questior of construction.

it seems, hovcver, that uvhen the

stipulatec sum is disTproyortionate to the presumed or Probable
damages, or to a reai-ily -ascertainable loss, the courts will
treat it as a renalty anf',vAil relieve on the crinciple that
the precise sum wo.s -not the essence of the agreeme.t, but was
in the nature of security for performance.
Plaintiff contracted to erect certain

oIses for

defendant; the contract yrovided that in case of default in
the comyletion of the vo1z by a certain date, plaintiff,
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"the contractor,

shall ray to the ovmer ten dollars for e 'ery

day thereafter that the said ;:o- L shall remain unfinished,
and for liqi&,ted

damages."

within the stipulated time,
the parties entered

Pl-intiff

fail

as

t- o -crform

and some time after his default

into a new

-emcnt,

which,

after recit-

ing the original contract, the failure to yarform, the desire
of the contractor for au: extension of time,

and to avoid the

payment of the "renalty", and after specifying what was to be
done to entitle plaintiff

to a waiver of his default,

contain-

ed the agreement "that the sum or renalty" due under said
contract "shall be l1,E40,
unless the worh is

by way of liquidated damages,"

coinieted by a day r:ced.

having been completed on the day nanel,

The worh not

the Iartios entered

into another agreement which recited the breach and a claim
on the rart of the rlaintiff that the "penalty" should

not

be exacted, as his :dcfault I;.7as excusable, "being caused by
an act of God," that is, by a severe storm.

The rarties

agreed thereby to a settlement of all other matter, "except
the one question of penalty" leaving that for liti,-ation
in

case -laintiff

chose to Iltigate the s ame.

brought to determine

laintifT's

liability

in

an action

to ray the sum
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st

.

ato-.,
o,

was by .ay of I-quid0.te
tiff's

cu: Cixc

tL.

-'a-e-, -ot

, the orii:L-ti contract
.

U -atlai

renalty;

-

default was not waivcd by tIe seconda contract, but,

on the cont..ary, recon e

his labilt

therefor.

,
t of :1al-tif.- v
Also, that as the ay'e''ue:

e theUei
and no rrovision .",as .....

,

absolute

the result of
1a'ast

interference with its ife-formance by an occurrence unforeseen
any b(,-.-n

lintiff'

available as a defense.
125 N.Y.,

230-1.).

3or.trol, such -a2, oco,,'rr
(Head

ce ;as :wo

ore :f 77ard vs.

K.R.B.Co.,

C 0 I

C L U S I 0 N .

The author's object in

taking this vast and com-

rlicated subject was to ascerta.in wrether a -articular

case,

which he has, comes under the head of a Penalty or Liquidated Damages; he has carefully and flit
rules and authorities

lfully examined the

a"7.1 cable thereto and has come to

the final conclusion, that no definite rules can be given
to ascertain under which head a case comes,

and many times

it is impossible to tell until the court of last resort has
passed uron it.

Clarence G. T. Smith,L.L.B.,
Attorney S- Counsellor at Uv4
Bro o7 Haven,
Suffolh Co.
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